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Skepticism as Epistemic Naturalization 
Dylan Vallance 
 
"If a road is leading us to a precipice, we do not drive ourselves over the precipice because there is a 
road leading to it; rather, we leave the road because of the precipice" – Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of 
Pyrrhonism  
 In this paper I will argue that the skeptical projects of Pyrrhonism and David Hume share a 
common target, which they attack using a shared method. That target is a broad theoretical structure that 
is comprised of three central metaphysical and epistemological points. These are the existence of an 
external world, the existence of a set of epistemic norms that determine a proposition’s logical 
relationship to that world, and a definition of truth as the state of a proposition that meets those epistemic 
norms, points which I will herein refer to collectively as “realism”. These points together form a picture 
of human knowledge which relies on a “strong” notion of truth in which the veridicality of a proposition 
is guaranteed or made probable by its meeting a set of epistemic norms in a process which constitutes 
“justification”. Both Sextus Empiricus and David Hume aim to dispose of all three of these points, and do 
so by explicitly questioning the conceptual coherence and empirical adequacy of each of them. In 
examining their approaches, I will focus on their shared treatment of the problem of induction as the 
argument which is most damaging to the cogency of the realist position and as a significant common 
thread underlying an overall project of skeptical empiricism. The consequences of the problem of 
induction for both of these writers are similar: the realist conception of truth is sacrificed as incoherent, 
belief is deflated from a commitment to a proposition’s being veridical to a proposition’s being cognized 
with a particular behavioural quality, and the “external world” is disposed of as a nonsensical concept 
barred from candidacy in establishing the truth or falsity of a proposition. Ultimately these criticisms 
position realism as entailing an epistemic error theory, wherein every proposition aspires to veridicality 
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and, due to the conceptual vacuity of an “external world”, is necessarily false. To avoid arriving at such a 
theory as a natural endpoint for epistemology I will look at Michael Williams’ contextualism as an 
example of an epistemological theory which effectively elucidates the consequences of Hume’s 
philosophy of mind by incorporating Hume’s disposal of metaphysical and epistemological realism and 
the consequentially deflated concepts of truth, belief, and justification, which that philosophy of mind 
entails. The centrepiece of the relationship between the philosophical standpoints of these writers is a 
shared conceptual deflation of truth: contextualism's use of a deflated account of truth mirrors that of both 
Pyrrhonian assent and Hume's phenomenological differentiation between belief and idea. 
 Sextus Empiricus, as his name evinces, belonged to the empiric school of Greek medicine. His 
book Outlines of Pyrrhonism is styled as an epistemological extension of the medical philosophy of that 
school and of the Methodic school, both of which rejected treatment on the basis of “hidden causes” and 
the latter of which rejected the need for an experiential “justification” of treatments. The project of 
Pyrrhonism has a very explicit, if immediately counter-intuitive, goal: to induce ataraxia (tranquility) in 
the reader or interlocutor. Tranquility is said to follow “as a shadow follows a body” from the recognition 
of the universal equipollence of claims to propositional truth or falsity and the epoche (suspension of 
judgment) which such a recognition produces. The goal of Pyrrhonism is thus not, as Williams charges, to 
“represent working practices as unworkable”1. Instead, it is to humble the concept of belief to the point 
where it no longer entails a commitment to the metaphysical truth of a proposition. Pyyrhonism 
accomplishes this by attacking a higher standard for belief in which belief entails commitment to the 
assertion of some external state of epistemically-privileged “real” affairs by demonstrating that such a 
standard is not reflected by everyday epistemic phenomenology.  
The resultant deflated notion of belief is described by Sextus variously as “acquiescence to 
appearance” and “conformity with traditional customs…and our own feelings”.2 Suspension of judgment 
                                                          
1 Michael Williams, Problems of Knowledge: A Critical Introduction to Epistemology (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 154. 
2 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism, edit. Julia Annas and Jonathan Barnes (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 6. 
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specifically entails suspending judgment as to the essential nature of things; thus, Sextus avoids charges 
of self-consumption by explaining that skeptics maintain their position while refraining from passing 
judgment on its metaphysical truth or falsity: “Thus, if people who hold beliefs posit as real the things 
they hold beliefs about, while Skeptics utter their own phrases in such a way that they are implicitly 
cancelled by themselves, then they cannot be said to hold beliefs in uttering them.”3 When using a 
definition of truth as the logical correspondence between a proposition and the external state of affairs 
that it denotes, and a definition of belief as committal to the truth of a proposition in the aforementioned 
sense, the skeptic cannot be said to hold beliefs. Upon disposing of the realist definition of truth, all that is 
left of “belief” is “acquiescing to appearance”, which is what the Pyrrhonian takes themselves to be doing 
in writing a skeptical treatise. Tranquility is entailed by the recognition that a realist conception of truth is  
both psychologically untenable and at odds with common epistemic practice: that is, that an aspiration to 
metaphysical truth is an obviously unnecessary headache. This recognition is in turn entailed by the 
recognition of the universal equipollence of truth-claims when placed under the epistemic standards 
produced by realism. A commitment to a view so starkly at odds with common epistemic practice, which 
aims to intelligently adjudicate between truth claims, will inevitably leave one torn between the need to 
differentiate between the epistemic privilege of contradictory truth-claims and their universal 
equipollence under a standard of truth which relies on a conceptually inaccessible external world. Sextus 
thus offers universal suspension of metaphysical judgment as the most expedient solution.   
Focusing on the Pyrrhonian’s goal of inducing tranquility is important for understanding skeptical 
methodology. Upon defining belief as “acquiescence” the alternative realist definition is differentiated not 
only by its entailing commitment to the metaphysical truth of a statement, but by the psychological 
process which the commitment amounts to: namely, an anxiety-inducing need for a proposition to meet an 
unreachable standard of truth. The skeptical modes are intended to emphasize what a hopelessly 
unrealizable exercise in meaningless self-distress this is by demonstrating how asymmetrical the realist 
                                                          
3 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism, 7 
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standard of truth is with common epistemic practice. It is the intractable tension between “external 
objects” and the propositions we purport to form about them that the Pyrrhonian argues is both 
symptomatic of the incoherence of realism and not actually required to engage in everyday epistemic 
discourse. The absence of tranquility is here symptomatic of a psychological attachment to a standard of 
truth that, due to its ultimate conceptual vacuity, can never be met, and the Pyrrhonian strategy lies in 
attempting to reduce the prevalence of that standard by painstakingly explicating its vacuity through the 
skeptical modes and thereby inducing epoche. As the standard of truth is eroded by the skeptical modes, 
what qualifies as a belief is transformed in lockstep, until what is left of the latter is “acquiescence to 
appearance”.  
Sextus’ expression of the problem of induction completes this process wholly and decisively, 
despite being a comparatively small part of the skeptical repertoire. By pointing out the circularity of 
Aristotelian syllogistic logic, Sextus implicitly makes a phenomenological point about knowledge which 
would be later elucidated by Hume: that propositions are the products of customary, self-reinforcing 
reactions to patterned experience: “thus when they (the dogmatists)…wish to conclude from the universal 
proposition ‘Everything human is animal’ to the particular proposition ‘Therefore Socrates is an animal’, 
which (as we have suggested) is actually confirmatory of the universal proposition in virtue of the 
inductive mode, they fall into the reciprocal argument, confirming the universal proposition inductively 
by way of each of the particulars and the particular deductively from the universal.”4 While not obviously 
an expression of the traditional problem, this argument demonstrates a key point implicit in Hume’s 
philosophy of mind which gives rise to the more specific formulation: universals are the only things 
which allow us to categorize experience into particulars, and yet the occurrence of such particulars is the 
only available evidence for the “reality” of universals. The lesson which the Pyrrhonian (and later and in 
more explicit terms, Hume) asks us to draw here is that the formulation of propositions, and their 
acceptance as being true or false, is entirely a matter of conditioned human behaviour. The framing of 
                                                          
4 Ibid., 120 
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arguments as chains of evidence which aim at metaphysical truth through their elevation of a conclusion 
to the standards of a natural epistemic norm (such as deductive validity or inductive confirmation) thus 
represents a severe outstripping of the kinds of conceptual resources we have available to us as well as a 
misunderstanding about what those epistemic norms actually imply about the propositions which meet 
them. The circularity that Sextus outlines is problematic only if the skeptic’s interlocutor is committed to 
the metaphysical truth of the conclusion: otherwise, the reciprocal support offered by the universal and 
particular are taken as compelling evidence for the acceptance of the conclusion, reflective as that support 
is of common epistemic practice. The logical vacuity of induction is here implied in order to reveal the 
logical vacuity of epistemic processes generally. 
When Williams chastises the skeptic for implicitly “raising the epistemic stakes” through the 
application of the Agrippan trilemma to a mundane assertion, he chastises the skeptic for importing a 
realist conception of knowledge into a conversation that functioned perfectly well without one and 
erroneously concluding from the subsequent collapse of coherence that “knowledge” is generally 
unattainable. But the skeptic does not subscribe to the standards that they place on an interlocutor: as 
Sextus is careful to emphasize, a Pyrrhonian subscribes to nothing with the standards of truth that the 
skeptical modes attack, and Williams therefore confuses the skeptical argument with its target. In order to 
understand how the problem of induction fully disposes of the realist’s metaphysical commitments as 
well as to understand the fundamental source of Sextus’ successful attack on realist epistemological 
norms as being the isolation of a deep asymmetry between epistemic phenomenology and realist theory, it 
will be helpful to turn to Hume’s philosophy of mind and exegesis of the problem of induction that it 
produces. 
For Hume, a deceptively simple axiom in his philosophy of mind gives rise to a massive 
proliferation of what might be called “skeptical conclusions”. This axiom is the copy principle, which 
states that every simple idea is copied from a chronologically antecedent simple impression. Hume's 
empiricism sacrifices access to the "external world" by rendering it a vacuous concept: the copy principle 
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precludes the formation of ideas which do not find their ultimate origin in the copy principle, meaning 
none of our ideas can ever contain semantic content which was not first copied from some experience. 
The realist notion of a world unmarred by the “filter” of human perception is thus quite literally 
inconceivable and can therefore play no role in epistemic processes. With the copy principle in place, 
Hume can swiftly dispose of a litany of realist characterizations of philosophical concepts as vacuous 
through a similar line of reasoning. The notion of existence is reduced by the copy principle to an empty 
appendage used to talk about experience: "The idea of existence then is the very same with the idea of 
what we conceive to be existent."5, in stark contrast to any possible realist definitions which rely on the 
inherence of an object in an external world. By observing that the idea of cause and effect can only have 
been copied from repeated instances of conjoined impressions, since the idea of causal necessity itself has 
no correspondent impression, Hume postulates a principle of association called custom, or habit, which is 
a law of psychological association in which the ideas copied from regularly repeated impressions become 
associated with one another to the point where the appearance of one impression conjures the idea of the 
other, producing what would be traditionally called a causal inference. Causality is thereby reduced to the 
customary association of impressions. 
The consequences of the reduction of causality to custom are remarkable. As Hume puts it 
succinctly in his Treatise: “Thus all probable reasoning is nothing but a species of sensation.”6. Moreover, 
Hume describes this principle of association as the source of many concepts that have disparate origins in 
a realist paradigm. Object identity is here a product of custom since the presumption of an object’s 
continued identity despite its transformation or removal from our senses is explicable only by the 
habituated anticipation of that object’s continued identity upon perceiving it a number of times. Notably, 
this serves as a direct response to the Cartesian “wax argument” wherein a transforming piece of wax is 
known necessarily by the intellect, since each of its physical qualities shift, meaning it cannot be “known 
                                                          
5 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, edit. Ernest Mossner. (Toronto: Penguin Books, 1985), 152 
6 David Hume, Treatise, 153. 
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by the senses alone”. For Hume, the operation of the “intellect” which Descartes describes is actually just 
a principle of association composed of patterned impressions and the anticipatory idea of their conjoined 
effects that it produces.  
It is not difficult to see what this radical empiricism does to realist metaphysical notions and 
epistemic norms. “Existence” cannot be a concept devoid of experiential information, because the copy 
principle precludes the existence of  any concept which is devoid of information with genealogical roots 
in a simple impression. Truth cannot be the correspondence of a proposition to the external world, since 
“external world” is similarly reduced to an empty concept which is impossible to meaningfully 
differentiate from our particular internal impressions, despite ostensibly referring to a world independent 
of those impressions. Consequently, belief cannot be a commitment to a proposition’s metaphysical truth. 
For Hume, beliefs are instead distinguished from idle thoughts by their vivacity, or put another way, by 
the strength with which the principle of custom acted in forming them. When an idea arises with a certain 
level of vivacity, or strength of causal anticipation, it becomes a belief. Belief thus has nothing to do with 
metaphysical truth and everything to do with the qualitative nature of the idea under question, which in 
turn is determined by the strength with which custom acted in forming it: this falls perfectly in line with 
Pyrrhonism, which aims at a conception of belief that “acquiesces to appearances”, that for Hume (and 
occasionally for Sextus himself) might be rephrased as “acquiescence to custom”.   
Hume’s empiricism, and the logical vacuity of induction which it precipitates, thus amounts to a 
total rejection of the coherence of a realist epistemology which postulates natural standards of truth 
inhering in natural kinds of belief and a realist metaphysics which postulates an external world which 
generates those standards and determines a proposition’s relationship to them. This result is largely 
reflective of the stated goal of Pyrrhonism: the rejection of the notion that one can ultimately determine 
the metaphysical truth of any given proposition, and the shrinking of belief to a simple notion of vivid, 
behaviour-precipitating conceptualization. Finally, assenting to the truth of Hume’s phenomenology 
leaves the realist in a very peculiar position. For the realist a belief is true if and only if what it asserts is 
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reflected by external reality: but if external reality qua reality devoid of human ideation is reduced by the 
copy principle to an empty concept, then there will never be an instance of a true belief, since what a 
belief asserts will necessarily be something other than nothing. Attempting to reach metaphysical truth by 
postulating an external world less radically different from our perceptions does not obviate this outcome, 
since an infinitesimally small difference between the semantic content of a proposition and the external 
“object” it denotes is both necessary for the division between objects and perceptions to be maintained 
and sufficient to preclude their absolute similarity and thereby establish the truth of the belief. This 
outcome is the ultimate goal of both Pyrrhonism and of the Humean skeptical project: realism has been 
transformed into an epistemic error theory at stark odds with everyday epistemic phenomenology. As 
Williams says (speaking, ironically, about Agrippan skepticism): “A theory which represents working 
practices as unworkable is a bad theory.” Accepting Hume’s phenomenology entails characterizing the 
realist position as precisely such a theory and, if Williams is to be heeded, entails disposing of the realist 
position in favour of a dramatically humbled concept of truth and correspondingly benign concept of 
belief. 
Before moving on to Williams’ contextualism as an example of just such a conceptual back-
pedalling, it will be useful to explicate how deeply the symmetry between Hume’s empiricism and 
Sextus’ explication of Pyrrhonism runs. Of primary note in both Hume’s Treatise and Sextus’ Outlines of 
Pyrrhonism is a tension between the depth of their skepticism and the breadth of their positive claims, 
illustrated in Hume by his explicit disposal of induction as a non-logical process in one instance and the 
forwarding of statements which openly rely on induction in others, as in this passage which occurs 
multiple sections after his deconstruction of causation: “I conclude, by an induction which seems to me 
very evident, that an opinion or belief is nothing but an idea, that is different from a fiction, not in the 
nature, or the order of its parts, but in the manner of its being conceived.”7 As we have seen, moments 
like these were of primary concern for Sextus as well, who was worried that they may invite charges of 
                                                          
7 Ibid., 146 
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self-consumption. Sextus and Hume make use of the same response to such charges: the notions of truth 
and justification under which they are writing are those reduced notions that have been necessitated by 
their skeptical arguments. Neither asserts the inviolability of their observations, and they construe their 
arguments as “reports of evident experience” in the case of Sextus or as instances of a particular kind of 
human behaviour in the case of Hume. Pyrrhonian assent is exhaustively described by the absence of 
committal to the metaphysical truth or falsity of a held statement, and Hume’s philosophy of mind 
explicitly disposes of the possibility of a such a committal being coherent, leaving Humean belief 
similarly stripped of a relationship with metaphysical truth.  
Williams’ contextualism, despite ostensibly aiming at a “solution” to skepticism,  shares a modest 
conception of both truth and belief with Pyrrhonism and Humean empiricism. The deflationary account of 
truth which Williams borrows from Quine construes truth as a modifier on sentences which allows people 
to talk about sentences rather than the content of sentences, reducing truth to an instrumental concept 
which aids in epistemic conversations by allowing  representation of a person’s stance toward a particular 
proposition (namely, whether a person commits to the logical implications of the proposition). Hume’s 
deflated definition of existence combined with his phenomenological definition of belief yield an 
epistemological theory which falls closely in line with the “default and challenge” model described by 
Williams which this deflated notion of truth figures into. Here, a belief is justified by context-specific 
epistemic standards unless a context-appropriate defeater arises. If, as Hume argues, belief is 
distinguished from idle fancy exclusively by the higher vivacity of the former, and the only available 
defeaters are other beliefs formed by custom (held by either the same individual or others), then there is 
no sense in which a belief can be either true or false independent of a behavioural context: truth and 
falsity are behavioural dispositions towards propositions. Beliefs are simply conditioned and fluctuating 
aspects of human psychology which might be reinforced or relinquished upon new experiences, such as a 
challenge for justification or the observation of new evidence, which motivate the disposal or affirmation 
of the belief. Even upon being challenged, the relinquishing of a belief and its replacement with a new 
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one never involves a recognition of the metaphysical falsity of one belief and the metaphysical truth of 
another, since truth and falsity in the realist sense are not quantifiable properties of propositions or even 
coherently conceivable, being as they are fundamentally empty concepts. Williams’ attack on skepticism 
involves isolating some principles of realism that he says the skeptic commits to, but a review of Hume’s 
views shows that the disposal of those realist commitments is precisely the goal of the empirical skeptic.  
The primary skeptical commitment which Williams claims stands in want of justification he  
names the “Prior Grounding conception of justification”. The prior grounding requirement is further 
subdivided into four sub-requirements, two of which are of particular interest in comparing Williams’ 
charge with extant skeptical beliefs. Of these, “Evidentialism”, Williams maintains, is the skeptic’s 
commitment to the notion that good grounds for a belief can only consist of propositions that contribute to 
the likely truth of the belief. “The Possession Principle” in turn states that a belief must be supported by 
evidence which is possessed and effectively used by the believer in order for the belief to be well-
grounded. Hume’s philosophy of mind and reduction of epistemology to a phenomenology of non-
rational principles of association through the problem of induction precludes the cogency of either of 
these requirements within the skeptical framework. This is succinctly demonstrated in a passage of his 
Treatise wherein Hume presents the example of a person approaching a river who then stops so as not to 
be pulled away by the current, despite not first articulating the elaborate evidential chain to justify the 
inference which Williams claims the skeptic demands: “But can we think, that on this occasion he reflects 
on any past experience, and called to remembrance instances, that he has seen or heard of, in order to 
discover the effects of water on animal bodies? No surely; this is not the method in which he proceeds in 
his reasoning”8. Hume’s disposal of a realist epistemology and metaphysics entails precisely what 
Williams thought such a procedure would: the disposal of the prior grounding requirement as an accurate 
description of epistemic phenomenology. Moreover, this result is reflected in the very target to which 
Williams ascribes a commitment to the prior grounding requirement: the Pyrrhonian. In discussing the 
                                                          
8 Ibid., 153 
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“standard of skeptical persuasion”, Sextus describes belief-formation as a process which makes no use of 
the prior grounding requirement, with the same passivity of assertion that appears in Hume’s example: 
“We say, then, that the standard of the Sceptical persuasion is what is apparent, implicitly meaning by this 
the appearances; for they depend on passive and unwilled feelings and are not objects of 
investigation…thus, attending to what is apparent, we live in accordance with everyday observances, 
without holding opinions-”9. The Pyrrhonian, like Hume and Williams, cannot characterize knowledge as 
requiring realist justification because the skeptical modes and the problem of induction reveal the 
incoherence of realist justification as a concept. Thus the prior grounding requirement has no role to play 
in the epistemic practices which result from both the skeptical modes and from Hume’s explication of the 
problem of induction, and Williams’ charge that skepticism is unjustified represents a deep 
misunderstanding of the purpose of the empirical skeptical projects.  
 The benefits of the rejection of the realist conception of truth through the problem of induction 
involve refuge from a litany of conceptual difficulties, one of the most striking of which is Cartesian 
skepticism. The problem of induction renders the postulation of an external world incoherent by reducing 
our epistemic equipment for concept-formation and inference to a set of principles of association which 
could not represent a thing defined by its isolation from any interference from those principles, viz. an 
“external” world. The problem of underdetermination raised by Cartesian skeptical hypotheses, wherein 
we are stripped of a method for determining whether or not our perceptions are veridical due to the 
coherence of mutually exclusive skeptical hypotheses with our experience, is no longer an open question. 
Veridicality itself is disposed of as an incoherent concept, relying as it does on the concept of a world 
independent of perception when Hume’s empiricism precludes the conceivability of anything independent 
of perception. 
                                                          
9 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines, 23 
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The skeptic’s target, contrary to the worries of Williams and countless other responders to radical 
philosophical skepticism, is not our ability to “know anything”. Rather, the skeptic aims to portray as 
disastrously incoherent a realist conception of knowledge which incorporates a standard of truth radically 
removed from common, or any possible, epistemic practice. “Common epistemic practice” is indeed 
rather the finish-line for empirical skepticism, and this is clearly demonstrated by Sextus Empiricus’ 
description of the skeptical persuasion. Upon disposing of the realist definition of knowledge, Pyrrhonian 
and Humean skepticism bring “knowledge” into greater  reflective equilibrium by integrating into it 
deflated accounts of truth and belief as well as the wholesale disposition of logical justification as an 
epistemically relevant concept, completely and necessarily absent as it is from common epistemic 
practice.  
The project of empirical skepticism is thus best understood as an attempt to diagnose the 
behaviour of philosophical realists and thereby provide an appropriate cure for the conceptual difficulties 
of realism in the form of a grand reductio ad absurdum of the entire realist project. Sextus Empiricus, 
through the skeptical modes and a prototypical explication of the problem of induction, demonstrates that 
philosophical realism sets for itself empirically unattainable and conceptually incoherent standards of 
truth and justification. A commitment to a proposition’s metaphysical truth instead amounts to the 
occurrence of an idiosyncratic emotional state characterized by the anxiety of wanting a proposition to 
meet an unattainable-because-incoherent standard of truth. In a fashion appropriate to the medical school 
of his namesake, Sextus consequently advocates for the universal suspension of judgments regarding the 
occurrence of obscure metaphysical qualities like propositional correspondence as a swift and universally 
applicable treatment for realists who wish to achieve tranquility. The incoherence of metaphysical and 
epistemological realism implied by Pyrrhonism is more fully elucidated by Hume’s philosophy of mind, 
which demonstrates that the logical vacuity of induction is symptomatic of the logical vacuity of 
cognitive operations generally, which are instead guided by behavioural patterns of association operating 
on sense-impressions. Custom, being the principle which gives rise to causal inference, here acts as the 
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fundamental source of all human understanding and inference, and thereby insists that the definition of 
belief as anything other than an idea of a particular vivacity induced by a particular instance of customary 
association with an impression necessarily exceeds the epistemic material available to us and is therefore 
a vacuous definition of belief at odds with common epistemic phenomenology. Likewise, truth and falsity 
in the realist sense of correspondence are disposed of as nonsensical, relying as they do on an incoherent 
concept of an external world and thereby precipitating an epistemic error theory which is profoundly 
asymmetrical with common epistemic practice. Hume’s analysis of belief into particular patterns of 
human behaviour and of justification into non-rational phenomenology is mirrored in Williams’ 
contextualism, and both philosophies represent theoretical embodiments of the stated goals of the old 
Pyrrhonians. Williams’ contextualism is thus far from an argument against skepticism, and instead acts as 
a realization of the skeptic’s goal of the disposition of metaphysical truth as a coherent concept, of 
justification as evidential proof of the correspondence between a belief and the external world, and of 
belief as a commitment to the metaphysical truth of a proposition. 
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